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Three Strikes and You’re Out: Louisiana’s Alternative
Fuel Usage Tax Credit Whiffs Tax Policy . . . Again
INTRODUCTION
In 2009, the Louisiana Legislature—keeping up with the nation’s
“green” movement—enacted Louisiana Revised Statute 47:6035, a
refundable tax credit for conversion of vehicles to alternative fuel
usage (CVAF).1 By enacting the CVAF, the legislature attempted to
incentivize both individuals and corporations “to invest in qualified
clean-burning motor vehicle fuel property,” with the goal of reducing
polluting emissions.2 What was initially meant as a boon for
Louisiana citizens actually created an unintended loophole for certain
vehicles, while costing Louisiana an estimated $200 million in
revenue over the CVAF’s lifetime.3
Specifically, the problem was whether flex-fuel vehicles, those
propelled by a blend of conventional and alternative fuels such as
ethanol, qualify for the credit.4 By default, most flex-fuel vehicles
have the ability to be propelled by gasoline or diesel.5 As a result,
taxpayers could elect the credit for vehicles that may never actually
employ alternative fuels, thus creating the possibility for a tax
benefit without an investment in alternative fuels.6
In 2012, taxpayers petitioned the Louisiana Department of
Revenue to clarify whether flex-fuel vehicles were eligible for the
credit, resulting in a ruling—which has since been repealed—stating
that flex-fuel vehicles did qualify, and further, that the CVAF creates
a “rebuttable presumption” that any alternative fuel vehicle listed on
the Louisiana Department of Energy’s website would qualify for the

Copyright 2015, by TIMOTHY MCGIBBONEY.
1. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6035 (2009) (amended 2013).
2. Id.
3. See Richard Reed, Alt-Fuel Vehicles Star In Louisiana's Latest Political
Drama, GREEN CAR REPORTS (June 25, 2012), http://www.greencarreports. com
/news/1077222_louisianas-latest-political-drama-involves-alt-fuel-vehicles, archived
at http://perma.cc/RZ92-WA89.
4. See Alternative Fuel Conversion, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa
.gov/ otaq/consumer/fuels/altfuels/altfuels.htm (last updated Jan. 16, 2015), archived
at http://perma.cc/YUF5-SGQL.
5. See Flex-Fuel Vehicles, DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://www.fueleconomy.gov/
fed/flextech.shtml (last modified Feb. 6, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/2HCBY9AU.
6. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6035(B)(2)(a) (2009) (amended 2013).
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credit.7 This ruling was met with cataclysmic opposition by Governor
Bobby Jindal, which was directed at Louisiana’s then Secretary of the
Department of Revenue.8 To resolve this obvious loophole, thus
limiting Louisiana’s exposure to revenue loss, the executive branch
issued its own ruling, which repealed the ruling by Department of
Revenue and set forth a solution: The CVAF would only be available
for flex-fuel vehicles with separate fuel storage and delivery systems
for the alternative fuel and without the ability to be propelled by
gasoline or diesel.9 Adhering to the executive branch’s scheme, the
legislature amended the CVAF to exclude from the credit’s
qualification vehicles that possess the capability to be propelled by
both gasoline and an alternative fuel.10 The effect of the amendment
was to restrict the scope of potential vehicles qualifying for the
CVAF—and the population of taxpayers realistically eligible for
qualifying for the credit—in such a way that the CVAF is now
discordant with the reason for its enactment. This amendment was a
knee-jerk reaction to a single problem, made without proper analysis
of applicable law or policy.
There are numerous issues surrounding the amendment to
Louisiana’s poorly enacted incentive device, particularly when a tax
policy analysis is performed, which specifically identifies efficiency
and equity issues. Additionally, Louisiana’s lack of alternative
fueling stations is a disincentive to purchase cost-intensive
alternative fuel vehicles, and the CVAF alone is insufficient as a
counterbalance.11 Furthermore, realistic application indicates the
CVAF’s regressive nature. Therefore, the CVAF’s amendment fails
to correct its true problems, especially when considering the
implications of tax policy.
By addressing the critical aspects of proper tax policy and
formation, this comment argues that the CVAF is not viable as an
incentive device to reduce polluting emissions because it is
inequitable and inefficient. Layering the discussion of proper tax
7. LA. DEPT. REV., INFO. BULL. NO. 12-025 (REPEALED), http://www.rev.state
.la.us/LawsPolicies/RIB%2012-025.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/59HF-QA5T
(flex-fuel vehicles were listed on the website).
8. The controversy surrounding the CVAF eventually led to the resignation of
the Secretary of the Department of Revenue only one day after Governor Jindal’s
opposition. State’s revenue secretary abruptly resigns after rule on tax breaks
rejected, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (June 15, 2012), http://www.nola.com/politics
/index.ssf/2012/06/states_revenue_secretary_abrup.html, archived at http://perma
.cc/PX5E-EVAK.
9. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61. I, § 1913 (2012).
10. 2013 La. Acts 219.
11. See Alternative Fuels Data Center, DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://www.afdc
.energy.gov/locator/stations/, archived at http://perma.cc/AR3W-ARZP (last updated
June 4, 2014).
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policy with a comparison of how other jurisdictions have approached
this issue, this comment blueprints how equity and efficiency within a
tax scheme must factor into the development of a tax credit. This
comment examines whether these types of tax credits are sensible,
using Louisiana’s CVAF as an example.
Part I of this comment explains the background for current local
and national policy regarding alternative energy sources and the
reduction of polluting emissions. Then, Part II outlines Louisiana’s
CVAF and its 2013 amendment. Part III presents a discussion of the
tax policy behind the enactment of tax credits within a tax scheme,
and Part IV of this comment compares different ways of instituting
incentive devices to promote alternative fuel usage and discusses
other options to accomplish the policy behind the CVAF. Part V of
this comment discusses the equity implications of Louisiana’s
current credit, while inquiring into the prudence of tax credits of this
nature. Finally, Part VI offers an equitable solution to Louisiana’s
Credit by applying ideas discussed throughout this comment.
I. BACKGROUND
Pollution is a global phenomenon;12 specifically, difficult issues
exist regarding air pollution.13 The best remedy to combat
pollution’s harmful effects on health, the environment, and property
is widely debated.14 Domestically, the national policy of the United
States is that pollution should be prevented, and if impossible to
completely prevent, it should, at the very least, be reduced at the
source.15 In stressing this policy, Congress further informs that
pollution source reduction is essentially different than, and
preferential to, the mere management and control of pollution.16
Preventing pollution at the outset affords vital economic and health
benefits, among other things.17 Here, the adage of “an ounce of
prevention is worth a pound of cure” is illustrative of the United
States’ policy on pollution prevention—eliminate the source of
12. Forms of pollution include air, water, noise, land, radioactive, and
thermal; however, this comment focuses on air pollution, specifically air
pollution from vehicles.
13. See What Are the Six Common Air Pollutants, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/air/urbanair/, archived at http://perma.cc/WK8M-AHRM (last
updated Dec. 22, 2014).
14. See id.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 13101(b) (2012).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 13101(a)(4) (2012).
17. “[P]ollution never created avoids the need for expensive investments in
waste management or cleanup.” Pollution Prevention, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http:
//www.epa.gov/p2/pubs/laws.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/2RG4-9M3A (last
updated Feb. 16, 2012).
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pollution outright, if possible, rather than implementing procedures
that only mitigate a source’s pollution—yet the real issue is
discovering what type of prevention works best.
A. Effects of Air Pollution
The World Health Organization estimates that two million
premature deaths are caused by air pollution annually.18 Each year in
the United States alone, 50,000 to 100,000 deaths are attributed to
air pollution.19 Air pollution harms humans by causing illnesses,
which include cardiovascular and respiratory diseases, as well as
many forms of cancer.20 The negative effects of air pollution can be
seen through climate change and the reduction of the Earth’s ozone
layer. Climate change, which can be attributed partially to air
pollution,21 negatively impacts health. Higher global temperatures
could increase summer deaths from heat waves and increase risks of
drowning, disease, and hunger from flooding.22 Finally, ozone
depletion, which can also be attributed to air pollution,23 allows
increased amounts of ultra violet radiation through to the Earth’s
surface, which significantly increases rates of skin cancer and could
result in 300,000 new cases of skin cancer each year.24

18. “Air pollution, which is closely associated with urbanization and
industrialization in developing countries, seriously impinges on the health of
children and adults alike . . . For most children in the large cities of developing
countries, breathing the air may be as harmful as smoking two packs of cigarettes a
day.” DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
16 (4th ed. 2011) (quoting The World Bank, World Development Report 1999/2000
141 (2000)).
19. Id.
20. ALEXANDER GILLESPIE, LEGAL COMMENTARIES WITH POLICY AND SCIENCE
CONSIDERATIONS, CLIMATE CHANGE, OZONE DEPLETION AND AIR POLLUTION 88
(2006). (The different forms of air pollution that cause injury are commonly referred
to as carcinogens.).
21. See HUNTER, supra note 18, at 4.
22. See id.
23. Id. at 6. Like climate change, ozone layer depletion occurs from a higher
concentration of pollutants, known as chlorofluorocarbons, existing in the
stratosphere.
24. Id. at 6 (for example, rates of skin cancer may increase by two percent
for every one percent loss in ozone coverage).
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1. Transportation Sector Emissions25
The Industrial Revolution’s improvement upon the engine
created a limitless demand for energy.26 As demand for energy
increased, polluting emissions created by the consumption of that
energy increased.27 For example, the transportation sector consumes
more than a quarter of commercially produced energy,28 and it is the
fastest growing sector of CO2 emission production.29 Experts
estimate that the transportation sector will account for over 30% of
global greenhouse gas emissions by 2020.30 Remarkably, cars alone
make up half of this sector’s total CO2 emissions.31
Road transportation presents its own separate concern within the
transportation sector due to massive increases in the world’s motor
vehicle fleet.32 Currently, almost 40 million vehicles are produced
annually, with estimates of nearly one billion vehicles by 2030.33 As
the transportation sector increases, energy demand increases, which
creates an endless cycle of producing polluting emissions—for these
reasons, incentives like the CVAF are enacted in an attempt to
contest the increasing amounts of vehicle pollution.
B. “Poverty is The Biggest Polluter”34: Economic Inequality and
Alternative Fuel Technology
Reducing pollution and poverty while increasing alternative fuel
usage are interdependent goals.35 The challenges of poverty may
drive an environmentally unsustainable use of resources and can

25. Emissions of the transportation sector are created by cars, trucks, trains,
boats, airplanes and any other types of vehicles engaging in the transportation of
humans or things.
26. GILLESPIE, supra note 20, at 44.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 43.
29. Id.
30. Id. “The CO2 emissions from the United States transport[ation] alone sector
amount to 5% of total global CO2 emissions.”
31. Id.
32. GILLESPIE, supra note 20, at 43.
33. Id. 40 million vehicles produced annually represents “more than one new
car every second.”
34. Akash Kapur, Pollution as Another Form of Poverty, N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/09/world/asia/09iht-letter.html?_r=0, archived at
http://perma.cc/4R83-AA2L (quoting Prime Minister Indira Gandhi at the first
United Nations environmental conference).
35. HUNTER, supra note 18, at 20.
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result in pollution.36 For example, the poor cannot always afford the
newest technology (which is presumably the least polluting),
specifically alternative fuel vehicles, and must use older vehicles that
produce much higher levels of polluting emissions. The inability to
purchase results in the inability to qualify for the CVAF, which is
only eligible for a taxpayer who purchases alternative fuel
technology.37 The resulting effect is a total exclusion of a highly
polluting subset of the population, which, according to the policy of
the CVAF, one would presume that an effective credit would target.
Moreover, many non-wealthy, but not impoverished, individuals
cannot afford to spend their disposable income to reduce their
pollution, which is especially true regarding high-cost products such
as vehicles.38 The average cost of an alternative fuel vehicle is higher
than its gasoline counterpart; however, the real issue is that the
impoverished cannot afford new cars, period.39 In Louisiana, the
average median household pre-tax income from 2009 to 2012 was
$40,660, meaning that, on average, half of the state’s income
producing drivers earn less than $40,000.40 Accordingly, new
alternative fuel vehicles are likely out of contention for at least half of
income producing drivers in Louisiana.
C. The Push for Alternative Energy Investment
The use of alternate energy sources, such as clean-burning
alternative fuels, is one way to prevent pollution at its source.41
Congress has already instituted many incentives, such as federal
tax credits,42 to encourage a variety of emission reduction practices
36. Id. “Environmental degradation, in turn, reduces the amount and quality of
resources available, pushing the poor to use increasingly marginal resources and
further perpetuating this destructive spiral.” Id.
37. See discussion infra Part V.A.
38. Alternative fuel versions of their gasoline-only counterparts are generally
$15,000-$20,000 more expensive. See Tara Baukus Mello, Ownership Costs of
Traditional Versus Alternative Fuel Vehicles: Depart of Energy Calculator Breaks
Down Pricing, AUTOWEEK (Feb. 3, 2013), http://autoweek.com/article/carnews/ownership-costs-traditional-versus-alternative-fuel-vehicles-departmentenergy, archived at http://perma.cc/YZ7H-K7LD.
39. See id.
40. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL SOC. & ECON. SUPPLEMENTS,
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical
/houseold/2012/H08B_2012.xls, archived at http://perma.cc/N442-KXLY.
41. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6035(B)(1) (2009) (amended 2013). Cleanburning alternative fuels have comparatively lower polluting emissions than gasoline
or diesel.
42. See generally Mona Hymel, The United States’ Experience with EnergyBased Tax Incentives: The Evidence Supporting Tax Incentives for Renewable
Energy, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 43 (2006).
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in the transportation sector because that sector generates a high
portion of polluting emissions.43 Many states have followed this
trend by offering their own incentive devices; like, for example,
Louisiana’s subsidy promoting alternative fuel usage.44
However, legislation drawn to reduce air pollution through
incentivizing investment in alternative energies through a tax credit
will fail—miserably—without properly considering tax and public
economic policy. As one scholar notes, “Because energy policy is
made in a political setting, it rarely comports with principles of
economic or public finance theory, and more often than not, energy
tax policy may compound existing distortions, rather than correct
them.”45
II. LOUISIANA’S TAX CREDIT FOR ALTERNATIVE FUEL VEHICLES
Louisiana originally enacted a tax credit to promote alternative
fuel usage in 1991.46 However, this credit was much less generous,
only providing a credit for up to 20% of the cost to convert the
vehicle to run on alternative fuels or, if the vehicle was purchased
with the capability to be propelled by alternative fuels from the
manufacturer, up to a $1,500 credit.47 By enacting the CVAF,
Louisiana’s legislature reaffirmed its intent to encourage the use of
alternative fuels as a means to reduce air pollution, while more than
doubling the amount of the tax credit.48 The legislature chose to
continue the use of a tax subsidy to incentivize the investment in and
usage of clean-burning motor vehicle fuel property.49
A. Mechanics of the CVAF
Both individual and corporate taxpayers are eligible to qualify
for the CVAF credit, and the credit is allowed per vehicle to be
elected against individual or corporate income tax liability.50
Before earning the CVAF credit, a taxpayer must initially invest in

43. See GILLESPIE, supra note 20.
44. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6035 (2009) (amended 2013).
45. Hymel, supra note 42, at 67 (quoting Salvatore Lazzari, CRS Issue Brief
for Congress: Energy Tax Policy, at CRS-3, 1 (2005)).
46. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:38 (repealed 2009).
47. Id.
48. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6035(C), (D) (2009) (amended 2013).
The credit now provides fifty percent of conversion costs and up to $3,000 for
vehicles with pre-installed alternative fuel capability.
49. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6035(A) (2009) (amended 2013).
50. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6035(C) (2009) (amended 2013).
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qualified clean-burning motor vehicle fuel property.51 Qualified
property includes equipment necessary for vehicles to operate on
alternative fuels, but categorically excludes equipment necessary
for vehicles to operate on gasoline or diesel.52 When consumed to
produce energy, alternative fuels result in emissions53 that are
“comparably lower than emissions from gasoline or diesel and
which meets or exceeds federal clean air standards.”54
After qualified property has been purchased, the taxpayer is
allowed a tax credit of 50% of the “cost of the qualified cleanburning motor vehicle property.”55 This investment in qualified
property is determined based on the type of property purchased.56
The investment amount can be the cost of the purchase and
installation of necessary equipment to modify a gasoline or diesel
propelled vehicle into one propelled by an alternative fuel.57
Alternatively, the investment amount can be the cost of a new
vehicle that is equipped to be propelled by an alternative fuel, but
that amount is limited to the portion of the vehicle attributable to the
propulsion of the alternative fuel.58 However, in situations where a
taxpayer is unable to, or elects not to determine the exact cost that is
attributable to such originally equipped property, a taxpayer may
claim the lesser of ten percent of the total vehicle cost, or $3,000.59
51. Id.
52. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6035(B)(3) (2009) (amended 2013).
53. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6035(B)(1) (2009) (amended 2013). Per the
statute, alternative fuels “includ[e] but [are] not limited to compressed natural gas,
liquefied natural gas, liquefied petroleum gas, biofuel, biodiesel, methanol, ethanol,
and electricity.” Id. (emphasis added).
54. Id.
55. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6035(C) (2009) (amended 2013).
56. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6035(B)(2) (2009) (amended 2013). If
possible, each taxpayer would necessarily choose the method of investment resulting
in the highest credit amount. This allows the taxpayer to maximize the credit’s
utility, which comports with the incentive nature of this subsidy.
57. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6035(B)(2)(a) (2009) (amended 2013). This
investment calculation method additionally requires that the qualified property and
its installation be paid by the vehicle’s owner, the installation must be performed by
a technician certified by the United States Environmental Protection Agency to
perform such modifications, and that the motor vehicle to be modified must be
registered in Louisiana.
58. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6035(B)(2)(b) (2009) (amended 2013). Portions
“attributable to the storage of the alternative fuel, the delivery of the alternative fuel
to the engine of the motor vehicle, and the exhaust of gases from combustion of the
alternative fuel [comprise the amount invested], provided the motor vehicle is
registered in [Louisiana].”
59. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6035(D) (2009) (amended 2013). To employ this
alternate calculation, a credit under subsection (C) must not have been previously
claimed, provided the vehicle is registered in Louisiana.
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Also, the investment amount may be the cost of the equipment that
is used to refuel alternative fuel vehicles.60
Once a taxpayer qualifies, the credit is applied to the final
amount of income tax liability owed to Louisiana. Generally, only
taxable income is subject to the income tax, which is calculated by
subtracting qualified deductions from the taxpayer’s total taxable
income.61 Income tax liability is determined by applying a tax rate
to that total taxable income.62 Any credits can then be applied to
further reduce the taxpayer’s liability.63 Moreover, certain credits
can be refundable, allowing a taxpayer with refundable credits in
excess of their tax liability to receive that excess as a cash refund.64
The CVAF is a refundable tax credit.65
B. Ending the Abuse: The CVAF’s Loophole and the Legislature’s
Near-sighted 2013 Amendment
The CVAF’s definition of alternative fuels, specifically its lack of
providing a sufficiently narrow definition, opened the door to an
unapproved and unintended expansion of the credit.66 The initial cost
of the CVAF for both corporate and individual taxpayers was
projected at $336,000 over its first two years.67 However, the actual
lost tax revenue grew exponentially over the CVAF’s first three years
totaling $27.5 million, with estimated losses in 2013-2014 of another
$20 million.68 This is significant compared to Louisiana’s 2012

60. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6035(B)(2)(c) (2009) (amended 2013). Qualified
alternative fuel delivery equipment includes compression equipment, storage tanks,
and dispensing units, provided such equipment is installed in Louisiana and no credit
has been previously claimed on such property. This investment calculation method
excludes equipment that delivers alternative fuels to vehicles “associated with
exploration and development activities necessary for severing natural resources from
the soil or ground.”
61. JAMES J. FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION 42 (2009).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6035(E) (2009) (amended 2013).
66. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6035(B)(1) (2009) (amended 2013). The
CVAF’s definition was an illustrative list of alternative fuels, which essentially
encompassed any type of alternative fuel including flex-fuels.
67. Tax Exemption Budget 2009-2010, LA. DEP’T OF REVENUE 29 (2009),
http://www.revenue.louisiana.gov/publications/TEB(2009).pdf, archived at http:
//perma.cc/6YDC-HUGE.
68. Tax Exemption Budget 2012-2013, LA. DEP’T OF REVENUE 19, 21 (2012),
http://www.rev.state.la.us/publications/TEB(2012).pdf, archived at http://perma.cc
/GAT2-FG5R.
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budget deficit of $6,686,217.69 More importantly, these amounts
represent 11.3% of Louisiana’s average annual revenue loss from all
tax incentives and exceptions combined over the same period.70 This
highly unexpected loss of revenue was “fueled” in 2012 by the former
Secretary of Revenue’s issuance of an emergency declaration
attempting to define which vehicles were eligible for the CVAF
credit, which included flex-fuel vehicles,71 the source of the
loophole.72 At the time of the ruling, the potential impact of this
loophole on the Louisiana budget was estimated at $200 million.73 In
an effort to resolve this unintended gap, the executive branch issued a
ruling to contemporaneously repeal the Louisiana Department of
Year

CVAF’s Estimated Cost

Revenue’s ruling and set forth a solution.74 The solution provided that
the tax credit is only available for flex-fuel vehicles with separate fuel
storage and delivery systems for the alternative fuel and that are also
capable of being solely propelled by the alternative fuel.75 Although
Governor Jindal repealed the emergency declaration, any tax credits
applied for before the rejection were honored by the Louisiana
Department of Revenue.76
69. State Budget 2013-2014, LA. DEP’T. OF REVENUE 1 (2013), http://www.doa
.louisiana.gov/opb/pub/FY14/StateBudget_FY14.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc
/Q274-XT8X.
70. Id. at 11.
71. See Flex-Fuel Vehicles, DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://www.fueleconomy.gov
/feg/flextech.shtml, archived at http://perma.cc/2HCB-Y9AU (last modified Feb. 6,
2015). Flex-fuel vehicles have the ability to be propelled by ethanol blends of fuel, a
type of alternative fuel, but they can also be fueled by regular gasoline using the
same fuel storage tank.
72. Greg Hilburn, Ruling On Credit Pending, THE NEWS-STAR (July 6, 2012,
11:36 PM), http://www.thenewsstar.com/article/20120707/NEWS01/207070328
/Ruling-credit-pending, archived at http://perma.cc/JT7Z-C2ZZ.
73. Id.
74. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61. I, § 1913 (2012).
75. Id.
76. Hilburn, supra note 72.
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Consider this practical application illustrating the loophole caused
by the CVAF’s vague drafting. After the CVAF’s enactment, a
corporation maintaining a fleet of vehicles purchases 1,000 new flexfuel vehicles, neither expending additional investment into alternative
fuels nor intending to propel the vehicles solely by alternative fuels.
The corporation then elects the CVAF for each flex-fuel vehicle
purchased.78 This results in a credit of $3,000,000,79 yet fails to
reduce emissions per the CVAF’s policy. Moreover, the corporation
is not statutorily compelled to use alternative fuel in these flex-fuel
vehicles. This unforeseen negative effect of the CVAF can be further
expanded to individuals and any other corporate taxpayers. Further
complicating the issue is the abundance and reasonableness of the
price of flex-fuel vehicles in relation to other alternative fuel vehicles.
Ultimately, each taxpayer purchasing flex-fuel vehicles, whether
energy and pollution conscience or not, would be entitled to a “free”
credit to continue using gasoline—thus, a total tax policy
insufficiency. 80
The CVAF’s loophole further compounded Louisiana’s already
problematic budget deficit. The legislature reacted in the 2013
Louisiana Legislative Session by proposing and subsequently
amending the CVAF to prevent the subsidy from reducing necessary
state revenue.81 The amendment essentially excluded flex-fuel
vehicles from qualifying for the CVAF by adding further restrictions
to flex-fuel vehicles.82 Under the amended CVAF, flex-fuel vehicles
77. Once the loophole was discovered, the revenue loss estimates were adjusted
to project losses based on current the year.
78. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6035(D) (2009) (amended 2013). In this
example, the corporate taxpayer would elect to take the lesser of ten percent or
$3,000 under subsection (D) of the CVAF.
79. ($3,000,000 = $3,000 x 1,000).
80. This violates the basic economic policy that there is no such thing as “free
bread.” The state shoulders a burden in exchange for nothing, which does not further
any economic principle or policy benefit.
81. 2013 La. Acts 219.
82. Id. The amendment in its entirety is as follows:
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can only qualify if the vehicle has only one fuel storage and delivery
system and no longer retains the ability to be propelled by gasoline
or diesel.83 The amendment is largely problematic because it focuses
only on the loophole, which was the immediate threat to the state,
and completely disregards necessary tax policy considerations that
must be met in order for a credit to be efficient, equitable, and
ultimately viable.
III. TAX POLICY FOR DUMMIES: THE CHALLENGE TO MAINTAIN
EQUITY & EFFICIENCY
A proper analysis of Louisiana’s tax credit, or any tax credit,
requires an understanding of legislative drafting and knowledge of
how legislators use policy as a tool to promote or regulate activities.
As a rule, tax theory analysis demands that justice exists among
taxpayers.84 Justice requires legislatures to continuously strive for a
balance between the state and its taxpayers.
As such, a conflict between equity and efficiency lies at the center
of tax policy.85 In balancing this conflict, justice entails fairness to the
taxpayer while guarding the state’s overall objective of maximizing
revenue and minimizing cost.86 Tax credits, as component parts of the
whole tax scheme, are governed by these same principles.87
Developing any component of a tax scheme necessitates considering
not only tax policy but the policy of other interacting areas.88

(C)(1)(a) The credit provided for in Subsection A of this Section shall be
allowed against individual or corporate income tax for the taxable period in
which the property is purchased and installed, if applicable, and shall be
equal to fifty percent of the cost of the qualified clean-burning motor
vehicle property.
(1)(b) – “Nothing in this Section shall be construed to authorize a tax credit
for the costs of a purchase of, or conversion of a vehicle to, a flexible fuel
vehicle that is designed to run on an alternative fuel and either petroleum
gasoline or petroleum diesel if the vehicle has only a single fuel storage
and delivery system and retains the capability to be propelled by petroleum
gasoline or petroleum diesel.
Id. (emphasis added).
83. Id.
84. See generally Liam Murphy, Taxes, Property, Justice, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 983 (2005).
85. Linda Sugin, A Philosophical Objection to the Optimal Tax Model, 64
TAX L. REV. 229, 229 (2011).
86. Id. When implementing a tax credit, there must be a consideration to
minimize not only the foregone revenue but also the costs incurred in maintaining
and servicing the tax credit.
87. See id.
88. HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 323 (1999).

2015]

COMMENT

523

Consider, for instance, the relationship between tax and public
economic theory.
In the field of economic theory, the concept of fairness comprises
the distribution of the tax burden across society, which is similar to
justice in tax policy.89 Efficiency, in economic theory, concerns the
social costs of raising revenue, which again serves as evidence of the
parallelism between tax and economic policy.90 However, problems
exist within this seemingly harmonized relationship.91 A tax with a
desirable distribution of the burden may contemporaneously impose
costs, among other things.92 Inevitably, legislatures face the perpetual
challenge of balancing these policy tradeoffs to maximize the efficient
allocation of resources while avoiding negative effects.
Because this comment discusses an income tax credit, it is worth
noting that the income tax plays a pivotal role in the analysis of
taxation and public economic policy.93 Issues with efficiencies and
externalities often arise in connection with public economic topics
like the CVAF.94 The optimal income tax, of which tax credits are a
component, is efficiently distributed through perfect resource
allocation.95
A. Efficiencies and Externalities
Efficient subsidies directly accomplish their policy goal. To
accomplish its goal, the CVAF must actually incentivize taxpayers
to purchase alternative fuel vehicles in order to reduce polluting
emissions. In reality, perfect allocation of resources rarely occurs,
which is due to externalities.96 Externalities are positive or
negative side effects caused by specific activities, which distort the
actual measure of costs or benefits the activity produces.97
89. Id. See also Sugin, supra note 85.
90. ROSEN, supra note 88. See also Sugin, supra note 85, at 229.
91. Sugin, supra note 85.
92. Id. These costs could include unforeseen administrative difficulty in
implementation, or the costs could be societal in nature, where the tax creates
unforeseen burdens depending on taxpayer circumstances.
93. J. A. Mirrlees, a Nobel Prize winning mathematician and economist,
authored the seminal work in this area, a technical analysis of optimal income
taxation primarily focused on the tradeoff between distribution and distortion of
income. See generally James A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum
Income Taxation, 38 REV. ECON. STUD. 175 (1971).
94. Id., at 207–08.
95. Eric M. Zolt, The Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation, 16 VA. TAX REV. 39,
63 (1996).
96. Id. at 69.
97. See id. The action of one party makes another party worse or better off, and
the first party neither bears the cost nor receives the benefits. See also JONATHAN
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Externalities can arise either from the production or consumption
of goods.98 Tax policy can be used to adjust inefficiencies caused
by externalities that distort the perfect allocation of resources.99
The key to maintain this balanced efficiency when using tax policy
is to limit the government’s action to the extent of the externality.
Therefore, the CVAF must be measured against the negative
externality it attempts to correct—air pollution.100
1. Negative Externalities
Negative externalities occur when an actor’s production or
consumption of a good harms others without compensation for the
harm caused.101 Within the energy and transportation sectors,
pollution is the primary example of a negative externality.102 In the
absence of regulatory intervention, pollution emitting players within
these sectors are only accountable for their own costs—essentially the
production process and resulting materials which subsequently emit
the pollution—while society at large is forced to endure the social and
environmental costs of the polluter’s activities.103 The government
could intervene to remedy the negative externality by taxing the
polluter’s actions104 or by incentivizing pollution reducing
behavior.105
Within these sectors, legislatures use tax policy to achieve
social, economic, environmental, or financial goals consisting
largely of taxes or subsidies. Taxes imposed discourage specific
behavior through financial penalties, while subsidies are incentive

GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 125 (Leo Kelly, et al. eds., 3rd ed.
2011).
98. For purposes for this comment, only externalities resulting from
consumption is relevant because the CVAF is a subsidy targeted at consumers of
vehicles.
99. See Zolt, supra note 95.
100. See infra Part III.A.1.
101. GRUBER, supra note 97, at 124.
102. Zolt, supra note 95. For example, consider a city like Chicago that is
crippled by gridlock during traffic hours by suburban commuters. The local
residents and businesses suffer the harmful effects of the pollution produced by
the commuters without reparation by the polluters. This imposes future health
expenditures on the local citizens.
103. Zolt, supra note 95, at 69–70.
104. Id. at 70.
105. Id. See also A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 192–93 (1960).
(English economist Arthur Pigou was the first to advocate using tax policy to
manage externalities).
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devices that encourage behavior.106 Arguably, subsidization through
governmental vouchers107 is less efficient than through tax credits
due to the administrative costs in determining which projects receive
the voucher.108 However, this is only true where the subsidization is
relatively equal to the negative externality it attempts to regulate.109
Louisiana’s CVAF is a subsidy that incentivizes the investment in
and use of clean-burning alternative fuels in an attempt to regulate air
pollution, a large-scale negative externality.110 Because the CVAF is
available for each polluting taxpayer to reduce their emissions, the
CVAF is efficient in that it is equal in size to the corresponding
negative externality.111 Perfect implementation of the CVAF should
correct the market inefficiencies that air pollution causes.
Ultimately, the CVAF encourages investment in certain assets
and not others, causing distortionary effects in and of itself.112 In a
perfect market, any implementation and use of the CVAF is
efficient, and even beneficial. This result is due to the reduced air
pollution that alternative fuel vehicles generate, providing benefits
to the environment and in turn, to peoples’ health. It is
administratively impossible to evaluate the actual amount of
pollution reduction the CVAF provides when implemented on an
individual taxpayer basis. However, some factors that must be
considered to determine if efficiency really is being accomplished
by the CVAF include whether a taxpayer’s previous vehicle was
more polluting and was actually replaced by the new alternative fuel
vehicle or whether the aggregate reduction in pollution attained by a
particular taxpayer correlates to the cost of the credit. Other factors
relating to equity cause the CVAF’s real failures.113
Therefore, the CVAF might be flawed, yet effective, regarding
efficiency, and the real question is how to design a better system.
In short, even though regulated externalities like pollution create
an inefficient market, legislatures must not assume that the tax
106. SALVATORE LAZZARI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33578, ENERGY TAX
POLICY: HISTORY AND CURRENT ISSUES 1 (2008), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc
/RL33578.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/A6YF-4EDN.
107. See discussion infra Part V.
108. Miranda Perry Fleischer, Equality of Opportunity and the Charitable
Tax Subsidies, 91 B.U.L. REV. 601, 612 (2011). Tax credits allow the individual
to shoulder the administrative cost by subsidizing their most valued project.
109. Id.
110. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6035 (2009) (amended 2013).
111. Each individual is the cause of pollution; therefore, if each individual
purchased an alternative fuel vehicle using the CVAF, there would be a directly
measurable reduction in pollution. The CVAF is efficient in that sense.
112. While important to note, this comment excludes discussion of those
distortionary market effects that are economic in nature.
113. See discussion infra Part V.
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system is the only remedial option.114 Corrective taxes impose
additional concerns, and policy makers should initially compare
what mechanisms could best address the inefficiencies present,
whether considering tax or non-tax programs.115 Legislatures must
consider other solutions that could accomplish the policy goals of
the CVAF better, void of these inherent issues of tax policy.
IV. COMPARISON OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS’ APPROACHES
Generally,116 the devices used to promote alternative fuel usage
in a jurisdiction fall within the categories of vouchers, subsidies (a la
the CVAF), loans and leases, grants, rebates, exemptions, or other
more narrowly tailored state-specific devices.117 For comparison,
Louisiana has six such devices, while the federal government has
47, the highest of any jurisdiction.118 For purposes of this comment,
only the most prominent devices will be discussed. Regardless of
the type of device used, the most important aspect is the device’s
goal and whether that goal is construed narrowly enough.
A. Devices Relating to the Development of The Alternative Fuel
Sector
While the federal government has enacted every type of
incentive device, the following are most informative for purposes
of this comment. The Alternative Fuel Infrastructure Tax Credit
provides that fueling equipment for natural gas, liquefied
petroleum gas (propane), electricity, ethanol blends, or diesel fuel
blends containing a minimum of 20% biodiesel, are eligible for a
tax credit of 30% of the equipment’s cost, but not to exceed
$30,000.119 Fueling station owners who install qualified equipment
at multiple sites are allowed to use the credit towards each
location.120 The credit, limited to $1,000, even extends to those
114. Zolt, supra note 95, at 70.
115. Id. at 70–71.
116. This discussion highlights the approach taken by other major jurisdictions in
furthering alternative fuel usage and the reduction of polluting emissions of vehicles,
but does not attempt to cover all approaches within the United States.
117. See Alternative Fuels Data Center, DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://www.afdc.
energy.gov/laws/matrix/incentive, archived at http://perma.cc/5BSE-EZGU (last
updated June 4, 2014). Other devices include discounts, rate reductions, or technical
assistance from the jurisdiction.
118. Id.
119. I.R.C. § 30C (West 2013). Permitting and inspection fees are not included
in covered expenses.
120. Id.
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consumers purchasing residential fueling equipment.121 Another
federal tax credit is the Alternative Fuel Excise Tax Credit, which
is an incentive available for alternative fuel that is sold for use to
operate a motor vehicle.122
Texas uses a similar approach. As part of the Texas Emissions
Reduction Plan,123 alternative fueling infrastructure grants are
awarded, which provides grants for 50% of eligible costs, up to
$500,000, to construct, reconstruct, or acquire a facility to store,
compress, or dispense alternative fuels in areas failing to meet the
state’s minimum air quality standards.124 Under the infrastructure
grant, qualified alternative fuels include biodiesel, electricity, natural
gas, hydrogen, propane, and fuel blends containing at least 85%
methanol (M85). Importantly, the entity receiving the grant must
agree to make the fueling station available to people and
organizations not associated with the grantee during certain times.125
Texas’s Diesel Fuel Blend Tax Exemption provides that the
biodiesel or ethanol portion of blended fuel containing taxable diesel
is exempt from the diesel fuel tax.126
California has 30 incentive devices; however, notably, the state
employs zero tax-based alternative fuel incentives.127 The California
Energy Commission additionally administers the Alternative and
Renewable Fuel and Vehicle Technology Program to provide
financial incentives for businesses, vehicle and technology
manufacturers, workforce training partners, fleet owners,128
consumers, and academic institutions with the goal of developing and
deploying alternative and renewable fuels and advanced
transportation technologies.129 Most importantly, California’s

121. See I.R.C. § 38 (a), (b) (West 2010); cf. 2007–43 I.R.B (similarly applied
credits).
122. I.R.C. 6426 (West 2013). However, this tax credit is not allowed if an
incentive for the same alternative fuel is also determined under the rules for the
ethanol or biodiesel tax credits.
123. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 386.051 (West 2013).
124. Id.
125. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§386, 393, 394.
126. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 162.204 (West 2015). The biodiesel or ethanol fuel
blend must be clearly identified on the retail pump, storage tank, and sales invoice in
order to be eligible for the exemption.
127. See Alternative Fuels Data Center, DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://www.afdc
.energy.gov/laws/matrix/incentive, archived at http://perma.cc/GUC9-2J88 (last
updated June 4, 2014).
128. California uses many different local grants for emission reduction of fleets
of vehicles.
129. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 44270 (West 2013).
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Alternative Fuel Vehicle and Fueling Infrastructure Grants provide
funding for projects that reduce pollution emissions from vehicles.130
B. Narrowly Targeted Devices
Narrowly targeted devices are solutions that use a direct means
to accomplish their policy goal. The Federal Government instituted
the Qualified Plug-In Electric Drive Motor Vehicle Tax Credit,
which provides a tax credit for the purchase of specific electric
vehicles.131 Texas provides a rebate towards the purchase price of
alternative fuel vehicles, which includes vehicles propelled by
compressed natural gas, liquefied petroleum gas, and electricity.132
California issues vouchers for the purchase of hybrid electric and
zero emission vehicles,133 while issuing rebates for plug-in hybrid
and zero emission light-duty vehicles.134
C. Common Themes
Common themes in other jurisdiction include the use of tax
subsidies, but these jurisdictions generally avoid tax credits simply for
the general purchase of alternative fuel vehicles. For example, the
credits for purchase of electric vehicles are sensible because this type
of vehicle emits zero pollution. The credit is completely efficient in
that regard while also encouraging investment in that particular
alternative fuel.135 Furthermore, the drafting of those credits are clear
and concise, which limits potential loopholes caused by vague, allencompassing drafting. Among these jurisdictions, there is significant
focus to incentivize the establishment of alternative fuel development
and its infrastructure, with specific incentives aimed toward engaging
businesses in that development. This allows the public to develop the
alternative energy sector, rather than the government developing it
using tax dollars. In contrast, Louisiana has no such infrastructure
development device other than the CVAF, which is capped at
$3,000—hardly enough to offset a material amount of infrastructure
130. Id. at § 44220 (b).
131. 26 U.S.C. § 30D (2012).
132. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 386.051 (West 2013).
133. Hybrid Voucher Incentive Project, CAL. AIR RESOURCES BD., http://www
.californiahvip.org/, archived at http://perma.cc/Q3ML-W2NC [hereinafter HVIP].
134. Clean Vehicle Rebate Project, CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE ENERGY, https:
//energycenter.org/clean-vehicle-rebate-project, archived at https://perma.cc/ZKV3MFMG (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).
135. Note that little, if any, extra investment in fueling infrastructure is needed
for electric vehicles (not considering the plug-in charger for the home included in the
purchase of the vehicle).
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investment. In that regard, the CVAF is useless. Moreover, a lack of
alternative fueling stations in Louisiana acts as a disincentive to invest
in alternative energy, regardless of the CVAF in place. For alternative
fuel use to be taken seriously, infrastructure must exist.
V. TAX EQUITY: THE REGRESSIVE NATURE OF THE CVAF
The concept of fairness in tax theory requires policymakers to
consider the equity of a tax scheme.136 Inevitably, each individual
policymaker’s ideals ultimately affect the equity of a tax scheme,137
and not all policymakers may view the fairness of a tax scheme
similarly.138 Some policymakers, for example, may disagree that the
CVAF is fair or even appropriate.
A. Horizontal and Vertical Equity Application
Generally, tax equity is comprised of vertical and horizontal
concepts.139 Vertical equity is the fair distribution of the tax burden on
people at different income levels, and horizontal equity is fair tax
treatment of people at the same income level.140 Because eligibility
for the CVAF requires taxpayers to invest money into alternative fuel
property, a discussion of vertical equity is more appropriate.
Accordingly, this section focuses on the fairness of the CVAF’s
treatment of taxpayers at different income levels. Analysis of the
CVAF reveals that it is regressive and unfairly beneficial to wealthy
taxpayers due to the high costs of new alternative fuel technology,
which is not an equitable result to Louisiana’s average taxpayer.
A regressive tax scheme decreases the tax rate as the taxable
base increases, which results in a lack of vertical equity to
taxpayers with lower taxable bases and should be avoided.141
While some regressive aspects of a tax scheme can function
properly, tax credits are generally not among them.142 Tax credits
return income, which, in the case of the CVAF’s investment
requirement, benefit wealthy taxpayers much less than non136. LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP TAXES AND
JUSTICE 12-13 (2002).
137. Zolt, supra note 95.
138. MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 136.
139. Id. at 37.
140. Id. at 13.
141. See id. at 13–15. Wealthy taxpayers have high taxable bases; vertical equity
requires that the taxable base and tax rate increase and decrease proportionally.
142. For example, fuel taxes are regressive due to requiring all taxpayers to
pay the same rate, regardless of wealth, with the idea that each taxpayer is taxed
the same for the polluting emissions produced by fuel consumption.
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wealthy taxpayers unable to purchase new alternative fuel
technology. Therefore, a regressive tax credit is one that is more
accessible to wealthy taxpayers and effectively decreases their tax
rate through a return of income.
The purpose of the CVAF is to encourage pollution reduction
through the use of alternative fuels, not to provide a tax reduction
device to the wealthy if they invest in alternative fuels. Wealthy
taxpayers comprise a much smaller segment of society, thus
comprising a smaller segment of total drivers in the transportation
sector causing pollution. Realistically, far fewer taxpayers are able
to elect the CVAF, which is evidence of the regressive nature of
the credit. However, any reduction of polluting emissions is
particularly beneficial to low income taxpayers that suffer the
harmful health consequences of pollution and its attributable health
care costs.
Moreover, due to the relationship between poverty and pollution,
the CVAF is focused towards the group of individual taxpayers
polluting the least in the transportation sector overall, because wealthy
taxpayers generally drive new, lower polluting vehicles, instead of
higher polluting, older ones. Non-wealthy individuals are harmed the
most due to the polluting emissions of their older gasoline propelled
vehicles and by being unable to afford brand new alternative fuel
vehicles. Thus, regarding the vertical equity of non-wealthy
taxpayers, the CVAF is unfair and undesirable because it only
benefits the wealthy.
However, this is not to propose that the CVAF as an incentive
device is by itself inequitable. Because tax credits are most
beneficial for non-wealthy taxpayers, the CVAF could be seen as
an incentive directed at those high polluting individuals to reduce
their emissions and receive income in return. However, the amount
of subsidization provided by the CVAF, regardless of income
levels, creates the high amount of vertical inequity. Greater vertical
equity would be achieved if the credit were proportioned between
wealthy and non-wealthy taxpayers. Notably, the higher polluters
lack the resources required to invest in alternative fuels, which
makes a tax credit useless as an incentive device. Incentivizing
pollution reduction in the transportation sector should not be
performed through a tax credit.
B. Caveat: The Cash for Clunkers143 Conundrum
In 2009, Congress authorized the trade-in of older and less fuelefficient vehicles in exchange for a voucher worth up to $4,500 to be
143. Act of 2009, H.R. 2751, 111th Cong. (2009).
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used toward the purchase of a more fuel-efficient vehicle.144 The
Cash for Clunkers scheme was designed to remove higher polluting
vehicles from the nationwide fleet, eliminating the possibility that
removed vehicles could be resold and return to use.145 To that extent,
the program allowed the resale of certain parts of the vehicle but
required that the engine and drivetrain be immobilized, crushed, and
then scrapped.146 The requirement of the scrapping process resulted in
additional air pollution and environmental harm that nearly offset the
program’s benefits relating to emission reduction.147 Therefore,
devices used to incentivize pollution reduction by removing lessefficient vehicles from the fleet utilizing a scrapping policy should be
focused on the highest polluting taxpayers because the polluting
emissions associated with scrapping equal roughly 10-15% of a
vehicle’s lifetime emissions.148 One might consider “scrapping” the
required scrapping policy in lieu of other considerations. For
example, a threshold level of acceptable polluting emissions could be
established, and any vehicles involved in such a program that emit
emissions over that level could be totally scrapped while the
remainder could be resold with emission modifications. Additionally,
to the extent efficiencies can be maintained, recycling all aspects of
the vehicles should be considered.149
VI. PROPOSALS AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
CVAF is an ineffective and inequitable incentive device as a
means of furthering the policy of reducing polluting emissions from
vehicles through alternative fuel investment. The credit’s vague
drafting imposed catastrophic costs upon a state already struggling
with a budget deficit, which forced the current legislative
amendment. To better encourage Louisiana taxpayers to reduce their
vehicles’ polluting emissions, the CVAF should largely be modified
to balance efficiency and improve vertical equity. First, the CVAF
should include an annual expenditure cap. Second, the CVAF
144. Marianne Tyrrell & John C. Dernback, The “Cash For Clunkers”
Program: A Sustainability Evaluation, 42 U. TOL. L. REV. 467, 467 (2011).
145. Id. at 478.
146. Id. See also 49 C.F.R. § 599.400–03 (2009).
147. See Alexander Allan et al., Abating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Through
Cash-For-Clunker Programs (July 20, 2009), http://cdm16255.contentdm.oclc.org
/cdm/fullbrowser/collection/p266401coll4/id/4441/rv/singleitem, archived at http:
//perma.cc/ZDH2-UXYA.
148. Id.
149. However, it is necessary to have an understanding that the recycling
process, in itself, can be harmful to the environment by creating many forms of
pollution.
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should include an income phase-out threshold amount and prohibit
corporate taxpayers from claiming the credit. Finally, the CVAF
should be implemented as a voucher system to continue
incentivizing corporate and wealthy individual taxpayers, while also
allowing the impoverished, who typically pollute the most, to
become eligible for the incentive.
A. Annual Cap on the CVAF
An annual cap of awarded credits would allow the Louisiana
Legislature to limit the exact amount of forgone revenue the state is
willing to risk. This cap would limit the exposure to loss caused by
the abuse of the CVAF’s vague drafting. The CVAF’s amendment
merely shut the door to one source of abuse, while leaving open the
potential for future abuse with other forms of alternative energy
vehicles. Louisiana should use the legislature’s initial CVAF cost
projections as a template for the amount of the cap.
B. Income Phase-out
Including an income phase-out for the CVAF would prevent
abuse by a significant number of taxpayers. This would result in
achieving greater vertical equity. Because tax credits return income
to taxpayers in greater need of the return based on public policy, a
threshold phase-out is proper to prevent the return of income to
wealthy taxpayers, which is an unnecessary drain from state
revenue. It is common and perfectly sound policy for tax credits to
include phase-out provisions. Moreover, a phase-out would affect a
non-material number of polluting individual taxpayers, due to the
distribution of wealth. The threshold would eliminate wasting any
of the capped amount of the credit from being awarded to those
wealthy taxpayers.
C. Voucher System
A voucher system provides maximum efficiency of the CVAF.
Vouchers must be applied for and approved by the government.
Appropriately, a cap on the total cash amount of vouchers annually
awarded would prevent the CVAF from being a categorically
granted incentive. Limited voucher funds forces the state to
thoroughly consider each applicant, selecting those that would
achieve the greatest reduction of polluting emissions, which
corresponds with the CVAF’s policy goal.
Corporate and wealthy taxpayers would remain incentivized to
invest in alternative fuels by being eligible for the CVAF vouchers,
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which is an equitable solution to their ineligibility under the credit
aspect of the CVAF. The state would award more vouchers to
corporations with large fleets of vehicles, taking into consideration
the amount of miles driven by the fleet and reducing the voucher
amount awarded for vehicles that are driven minimally.150 Wealthy
individual taxpayers would be similarly considered. Vouchers
would be awarded to the highest polluting taxpayers, which
follows the CVAF’s policy and is a component of efficiency. Low
income individuals are categorically prohibited from eligibility
under the current CVAF due to the high cost of alternative fuel
technology. Because this class typically creates the most polluting
emissions per driver, the state could issue vouchers to the
applicants where an alternative fuel vehicle would result in the
greatest polluting emission reduction, taking into consideration the
nature and extent of the individual’s use of their vehicle. More
consideration should be given to low income individuals in this
class using their own vehicle to make a living that requires driving
many miles, which results in the most pollution.
Arguably, however, wealthy individual taxpayers would be
given higher voucher priority over low income individuals, but
independently from corporate taxpayers, due to the actual
investment in alternative fuel technology made by those individuals.
This comment neither concerns itself with that issue, nor reaches
that conclusion. Ultimately, the greatest benefits of a voucher
system include the ability for the state to issue the vouchers on a
case by case basis and increasing eligibility of low income
individuals by removing the economic barriers of the CVAF while
avoiding the unnecessary return of income to wealthy taxpayers.
These benefits greatly increase the efficiency and fairness of the
CVAF.
D. Local Action the Best Implementation Strategy?
If reducing emissions is a major policy consideration, some
proponents recommend that the bulk of regulatory action be taken
by parish/county or city-level governments—i.e. local action.151
This is evidenced in jurisdictions such as California,152 a pioneer of
promoting alternative fuel technology. Local action could be
150. For example, vehicles driven by corporate executives would not be included
in the voucher award amount.
151. BENJAMIN J. RICHARDSON, LOCAL CLIMATE CHANGE LAW 8 (Benjamin J.
Richardson ed., 2012).
152. See California Laws and Incentives, DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://www.afdc
.energy.gov/laws/all?state=CA, archived at http://perma.cc/DE9V-M788 (last
updated June 4, 2014).
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initiated and implemented more quickly than the slower legislative
speed of state and federal government.153 As a result of this quick
implementation, state and federal governments could use each
locality’s implementations as policy experiments that provide
evidence on how best to draft similar legislation.154 Moreover,
local authorities are more aware of, and may more easily identify,
pollution issues within their own jurisdiction.155 However, local
action has been met with criticism. The most predominant
criticisms include local governments’ lack of financial resources
and their officials’ lack of sufficient expertise and knowledge in
pollution regulation or alternative fuels.156 Thus, this comment
does not advocate local action as a solution, but instead wishes to
identify the potential increase of the voucher’s efficiency while
assigning its administrative cost proportionally if implemented
locally, rather than state-wide.
CONCLUSION
Although the CVAF’s amendment corrected one glaring
problem with the subsidy, the legislature overlooked the credit’s real
issues under a tax theory analysis: flawed efficiency and inequity.
These issues can be fixed, and the CVAF’s policy furthered, by
imposing an annual limit and an income phase out threshold on the
subsidy. Furthermore, the CVAF should include a provision
implementing a voucher system similar to other jurisdictions. This
would increase the eligibility of corporate taxpayers and individuals
of any income level, which results in greater equity while focusing
on most efficiently achieving the legislature’s policy goals. By
implementing these solutions, Louisiana can maintain a viable
incentive device; otherwise, the CVAF is a regressive tax credit that
fails to accomplish its goal.
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153. RICHARDSON, supra note 151, at 13.
154. Id. at 13–14.
155. See id.
156. Id. at 14.
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